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ABSTRACT: 
 
 China‘s urban residential communities are currently facing mounting levels of 
water scarcity with the potential to impact social and even possibly political stability. 
China‘s central government is currently attempting to mitigate such potential risk by 
adopting a variety of projects aimed at combating potable water shortages. This paper 
sets out to analyze three of the national projects adopted by China‘s central government 
to combat critical residential water shortages currently affecting China‘s urban areas. The 
three projects are South North River Transfer Project, the adoption of tiered water pricing 
system, and the construction of desalinization facilities in some coastal cities. Each of 
these projects distributional equality, political feasibility, cost effectiveness, and 
environmental impact will be examined so as to determine which serves as the best viable 
solution to China‘s current water shortages. The variety of these projects suggests a 
single policy will be unable to provide a complete solution to China‘s residential water 
shortages. Rather the direness of China‘s urban water scarcity will require the 
simultaneous adoption of multiple policies to fully address the potable water needs of 
China‘s urban residential communities.  
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INTRODUCTION: 
  
 China‘s former Premier Wen Jibiao, was not simply being an alarmist when he stated in 
1999, that ―the survival of the Chinese nation is threatened by the country's shortage of 
water.‖1Today China faces water shortages that threaten to undermine the nation‘s social, 
economic and political prosperity. Although, this research is limited in scope to the water 
shortages affecting China‘s urban residential communities and their associated solutions, finding 
a viable solution to these communities current water shortages will likely have a sizable impact 
on China‘s overall level of water shortages, as China‘s urban residential areas represent the 
country‘s largest population centers. China‘s central government is currently exploring a variety 
of options including solutions that focus on increasing the supply of potable water in urban 
residential areas, the South North River Transfer (SNRT) project and the construction of 
desalination facilities, as well as a solution aimed at curbing urban residential demand for 
potable water, the implementation of an increasing block tariff (IBT) pricing scheme. In terms of 
the projects‘ political feasibly, cost effectiveness, distributional equality, and environmental 
impact each of the three solutions has its own individual strengths and weakness.  
 Overall, this research seeks to compare the individual projects along the same criteria to 
determine which holds the potential to provide a viable solution to the water shortages currently 
facing China‘s urban residential communities. The project which is best able to not only  find a 
sustainable tradeoff  between cost effectiveness and environmental impact,  but is also able to 
balance decreasing water demand, encouraging water conservation with increasing the supply of 
potable water in China‘s urban residential areas, will be the one determined to be the most viable 
                                                          
1
 McAlister, J. 2005. 'China‘s water crisis,‖' Deutsche Bank AG Asia-Pacific Equity Research. March 22. 
http://www.cbiz.cn/download/aquabio.pdf 
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of the three projects. This research is focused on examining the projects already adopted by 
China‘s central government in order to determine which among them represents the most 
practical long term solution to water shortages in China‘s urban residential communities.  
 The ideal solution to China‘s urban residential potable water shortages would be a project 
or multiple projects that are able to be both economical and environmentally friendly, while still 
individualized enough to suit the specific water needs of a given community. Additionally, 
China‘s central government should seek to incentivize water conservation and try to strike a 
balance between decreasing residential demand for potable water and simultaneously increasing 
the available supply of potable water. Overall, the three projects disused in this paper will be 
compared against these criteria.  
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: 
 
Outline of Research Breakdown:  
 This paper, apart from the overall introduction and conclusion is divided into four major 
chapters. The first chapter is a discussion of the impact of continued water shortages in China. 
This chapter lays out a timeline for the depletion of potable water in China‘s urban residential 
areas. It also provides context on the extent of China‘s current water shortages, and provides a 
framework for the other three projects that gives justification for this research by outlining the 
importance of implementing a plan to solve effectively the current water urban residential water 
shortages in China.  
 The remaining three chapters examine of three different projects currently being 
implemented by China‘s central government to combat China‘s urban residential water shortages. 
The three projects are the SNRT project, an  IBT  water pricing scheme, and the construction of 
desalination facilities, each of which will be compared along the same four predetermined 
criteria.  Each of these three chapters is subdivided into six major subsections. These six 
subsections include a project background explanation, an examination of the project‘s 
distributional equality, political feasibility, cost effectiveness, environmental impact, and then a 
discussion of that particular project‘s overall conclusions. All of the projects are compared along 
the same criteria in order to determine which project represents the most effective model for 
combatting urban residential water scarcity in China.  
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Justification of Chosen Projects:  
 Although a more specific explanation of each project will be provided in the background 
section of chapters two through four, the three projects were chosen because each is state 
sponsored approach, undertaken by the Chinese government towards combating urban residential 
water shortages. As each of the three projects is to some extent being introduced on a national 
level and is backed by the Chinese central government, there is enough commonality between 
the projects to compare them effectively along similar criteria.  There is also enough variety 
among the projects to gauge the relative effectiveness of the different approaches to combating 
China‘s residential water shortages. This allows for comparison between projects that are 
increasing the supply of potable water to those that are oriented towards decreasing demand of 
water. As these three policies represent a spectrum of China‘s response to current urban 
residential water shortages, by comparing them along the four predetermined criteria this 
research will be able to judge the inherent strengths and weakness of each approach as it is suited 
for success in China.   
Definition of the Four Criteria:  
 This section provides a basic definition of each of the four criteria used to evaluate the 
potential success of each of the three projects in combating China‘s urban residential water 
shortages. These criteria include each project‘s distributional equality, political feasibility, cost 
effectiveness, and environmental impact. Although the specific examples discussed in each 
chapter will be adapted to be relevant to each of the three projects, the following definitions 
provide a basic explanation of the aspects of each project that will be evaluated by the individual 
criteria.  
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Distributional Equality: 
 This section will evaluate the extent to which the potential benefits of each of the three 
projects are equally distributed across China. This section will primarily take into account 
disparities in the geographic distribution of each project, particularity in terms of the divide 
between Northern and Southern China. When relevant this section will include an examination of 
the extent to which each project benefits certain regions of China (typically Northern China) at 
the expense of other regions (typically Southern China). This includes drawing conclusions 
about potential threats to social stability and increases in social tension due to policies that 
unevenly distribute water.   
Political Feasibility:  
 This section will examine the political commitment of China‘s central government to the 
successful implementation of each of the individual projects. This includes examining factors 
that incentivize government and party commitment to the projects.  This section will also look at 
how the unique political structure of China as an authoritarian state, has influenced the 
structuring and potential success of each project of each individual project. 
Cost Effectiveness: 
 This will be the most quantitative of the four criteria sections. This section will examine 
the overall cost of fully implementing each of the three projects, as well as the economic benefits 
and limitations of each project.  This will include both initial costs of the projects, as well as 
future financial costs of continuing the projects, and when relevant the financial stress added to 
local economies by the project. The section will discuss the economic and financial impacts 
6 
 
uniquely associated with each of the three projects, in an attempt to determine the most cost 
effective means of combating water shortages in China‘s urban residential areas.   
Environmental Impact:  
 This section will examine the overall impact each of the three projects has had on the 
urban residential water situation in China in terms of increasing supply, decreasing demand, and 
environmental conservation.  The section will consider both the short and long term 
environmental impacts of the each of the three projects. This section will take into consideration 
the environment costs of each of the three projects, including the potential for pollution and the 
threat to biodiversity. Overall, this section seeks to determine the ability of each project to 
decrease water shortages while simultaneously minimizing the risk of environmental damage.  
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CHAPTER 1: THE THREAT OF WATER SHORTAGES IN CHINA 
1. 1 Background of China’s Water Shortages:  
 There is a fundamental shortage of potable water in China. China currently has 21% of 
the world‘s population, but only 6% of the world‘s potable water.2 This situation is further 
exacerbated by the fact that China‘s water resources are not equally distributed across the 
country, 43% of China‘s population lives in Northern China, but this region only holds 19.6% of 
the country‘s water resources.3 The problem of e water shortages in China is likely only to be 
compounded over the next couple decades as China‘s population is projected to continue to 
increase, while the nation‘s supply of potable water will likely decrease.4   
 By 2033,  China‘s per capita natural freshwater resources will likely decline to only 1,875 
cubic meters, down from 2,156 cubic meters in 2007, when China‘s freshwater resources already 
ranked among the lowest per capita for a major country.
5
 China‘s water crisis has grown so dire 
that according to Chinese officials ―by 2030 [China‘s] water use will reach or approach the total 
volume of exploitable water resources.‖6  Overall, China‘s central government must implement 
new solutions to combat water shortages in order to preserve China‘s social stability, economic 
growth, agricultural security, and prevent China from running out of potable water.  
                                                          
2
 Wong, Gabriel. "China's War on Water Scarcity." Gridlines, 2013. https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/capital-projects-
infrastructure/assets/chinas-war-on-water-scarcity.pdf. 
3
 "Urbanization and Economic Growth." Part II Supporting Reports. 
https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/EAP/China/Urban-China-SRs1-3.pdf. 
4
 Zhang, Henry H., and David Brown. "Understanding Urban Residential Water Use in Beijing and Tianjin, 
China." Habitat International 29 (2004). 
http://www.colorado.edu/geography/class_homepages/geog_4501_sm06/WCChina.pdf. 
5
 "China‘s Water Crisis Part II – Water Facts At A Glance." China Water Risk, 2010. http://chinawaterrisk.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/06/Chinas-Water-Crisis-Part-2.pdf. 
6
 Buckley, Chris. "China Says Water Supplies Exploited by 2030." Reuters. December 14, 2007. 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/12/14/environment-china-drought-dc-idUKPEK13275320071214. 
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1.2 Exasperation of Urbanization:  
 In China in the early 1990s a new wave of economic reforms gradually encouraged rural 
to urban migration, by 1990 approximately 26% of China‘s population lived in urban areas.7 As 
a result of China‘s Opening Up and Reform Policy, and the increasing economic opportunities 
available, urbanization rapidly increased in China such that for the first time in 2011 the majority 
of China‘s population (51.3%) lived in urban areas.8 This rapid urbanization has had a twofold 
impact on potable water in China‘s urban area.  
 First, this increase in population places many areas in China under increased water stress. 
As of 2013, 60% of China‘s 660 cities were classified as short of water.9 Additionally, 108 cities, 
including China‘s capital Beijing, face the threat of ―serious water shortages‖.10 Beijing, a city 
that has experienced some of the highest levels of population growth, current water recourses 
only amount for 230 cubic meters of fresh water per capita.
11
 This is considered ―far below the 
world water poverty mark.‖12 Despite policies such as the one child policy aimed at curbing 
population growth, China‘s central government has been unable to stifle increasing population 
growth and particularly swelling populations in urban areas that place increasing pressures on an 
already limited source of freshwater resources in China.  
 Second, the rapid urbanization and economic growth in China has resulted in increased 
levels of water pollution. This pollution has affected China‘s current potable water resource 
                                                          
7
 Jia, Lili, and Chao Bao. "Residential Fresh Water Demand in China." ZEF Working Paper 126 (2014). 
http://www.zef.de/uploads/tx_zefnews/wp126.pdf. 
8
 Ibid., 6  
9
 Wong, Gabriel. "China's War on Water Scarcity." Gridlines, 2013. https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/capital-projects-
infrastructure/assets/chinas-war-on-water-scarcity.pdf. 
10
 "Urbanization and Economic Growth." Part II Supporting Reports. 
https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/EAP/China/Urban-China-SRs1-3.pdf. 
11
 Ibid., 1 
12
 Ibid., 1  
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situation by causing drinking water standards in roughly half of China‘s cities to fall below 
provincial drinking water quality standards.
13
 China‘s numerous urban development projects, and 
many industrial plants, which have sprung up as a result of China‘s rapid urbanization, have only 
aggravated the pollution of lakes and aquifers in China.  
1.3 The Threat of Water Shortages in Beijing 
 Beijing, like many other cities suffers from natural geographic water shortages of 
Northern China, exacerbated by the city‘s growing population and rapid industrialization. 
However, such urban residential water shortages are perhaps more precarious in Beijing than in 
any other Chinese city, because Beijing is China‘s capital. The central government is committed 
to preventing Beijing from running out of potable water, because doing so could threaten the 
social and political stability of China.  
 Beijing currently is suffering from a water shortage on par with many countries in the 
Middle East.
14
  Some experts such as Xu Xinyi, Director of the Beijing Normal University 
College of Water Sciences, blame these water shortages on overpopulation, which continue to 
place incredibly high demands on the city‘s already overstretched aquifers.15 However, certain 
―local government and business [practices that have] recklessly pursu[ed] quick money by 
developing projects that devoured resources and caused serious pollution,‖ have likely worsened 
Beijing‘s already grim water situation.16 
                                                          
13
 Ibid., 4  
14
 LIn, Luna. "Beijing Water Shortages Worse than the Middle East." China Dialogue, 2013. http://urban-africa-
china.angonet.org/sites/default/files/resource_files/beijing_water_shortage_-_chinadialogue_29_aug_2013.pdf. 
15
 Roberts, Dexter. "China's Water Supply Is Contaminated and Shrinking." Bloomberg. November 19, 2014. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-11-19/chinas-water-supply-is-contaminated-and-shrinking. 
16
 Ibid.,1 
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  Although the problem of potable water shortages is not unique to Beijing, the situation is 
made more dire because as the capital city Beijing is the center of the government and the 
Communist Party power in China. Therefore, reports that Beijing residents have been driven to 
dig illegal wells as a means of combating local water shortages represents the critical point 
reached by the water shortages in Beijing.
17
 China‘s central government simply cannot afford to 
let Beijing run out of potable water, doing would likely cause irreparable damage the Communist 
Party‘s image, framing them as unable to even provide the most basic of resources to the people 
of their own capital. This in turn would likely also incite social and political instability.  
 It is likely as a result of the high stakes associated with maintaining a state of water 
stability in China‘s capital that all of the projects addressed in this paper are in some way aimed 
at alleviating water shortages in Beijing. The magnitude of the projects into which China‘s 
central government is willing to invest, particularly the SNRT project, in order to combat 
residential water shortages in Beijing demonstrates the national political importance of 
mitigating residential potable water shortages in the city.  
1.4 Domestic Business Implications:  
 China‘s current water shortages if not reversed or at the very least stabilized will likely 
threaten to undermine the remarkable economic progress achieved by China over the last thirty 
years. Chronic water shortages and resulting high levels of pollution in major natural freshwater 
sources, such as the Yangtze River, could result in China becoming a less attractive destination 
for foreign companies. Foreign businesses are going to be unlikely to invest in a country facing a 
chronic shortage of natural resources particularly a resource as critical as water. Freshwater is 
                                                          
17
 Economy, Elizabeth. "China's Growing Water Crisis." World Politics Review. August 9, 2011. 
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9684/chinas-growing-water-crisis#. 
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not only important to many manufacturing processes, but also the use of coal power, China‘s current 
major source of fuel is a process that is incredibly water intensive.
18
 As a result of these, and 
possibly other factors, China‘s levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) would likely fall should 
China‘s central government fail to enact a viable solution to China‘s current problems of water 
scarcity.  
 Decreases in FDI would hurt China‘s overall economic growth, as many sectors such as 
manufacturing, have become relatively reliant on high levels of FDI to sustain their business 
models. In this way failing to solve China‘ water shortages pose a direct threat to China‘s 
miraculous economic growth. A lack of the basic natural resources, such as potable water, would 
cause China to become an undesirable market for expanding foreign companies and their 
resulting investment and capital.  
1.5 Implications for Regional Relationships  
 Although the focus of this paper is primarily China‘s domestic response to urban 
residential potable water shortages it would be incomplete to assume that water shortages, and 
the solutions enacted to resolve them did not affect China‘s relationships with its regional 
neighbors in South Asia, several of whom also suffer of similar water shortages.  
 Perhaps the most significant of these regional relationships effect by China‘s current 
water policy is the Sin-India relationship. The western route of the SNRT project, though 
currently still in planning phases, will divert water from the head of the Yangtze River at the 
Himalayan plateau.
19
 This project will potentially have large political consequences for China as 
construction of the proposed dams on the Brahmaputra and Mekong Rivers are very likely to 
                                                          
18
 Wong, Gabriel. "China's War on Water Scarcity." Gridlines, 2013. https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/capital-projects-
infrastructure/assets/chinas-war-on-water-scarcity.pdf. 
19
 "China Tries to Overcome Its Water Limitations." Stratfor. June 11, 2013. 
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china-tries-overcome-its-water-limitations. 
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have an impact on downstream countries that include India, Bangladesh and Vietnam. Although 
China‘s central government claims that the project would only siphon off approximately 1% of 
the run-off from the Brahmaputra River, there has still been much uproar in India against the 
project that is seen as potentially threatening India‘s own limited water resources.20  The fact that 
the majority of western route of the SNRT project is located in the contested Tibetan 
autonomous region only further complicates potential water conflicts and provides strategic 
motivation for China to maintain control over the water supply.  
 Since 1950, when China and India first established formal diplomatic relations, the two 
countries‘ relationships, though previously characterized by border disputes and armed conflicts, 
have since the 1980s found common ground in economic cooperation.
21
 Thus, the two countries‘ 
relationship has been relatively stable, though perhaps not overly friendly.
22
 India currently 
suffers from its own potable water shortages, a situation that like in China is made worse by 
India‘s growing population.23  
  Given the history between Sino-Indian relations, as well as the increasing severity of the 
future water shortages facing both countries, it is possible that the western route of the SNRT 
project could create a potential hotspot as the world‘s two most populous countries compete for 
                                                          
20
 Das, Rup Narayan. "India-China Relations A New Paradigm." Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, 2013. 
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCEQFjAA&ur
l=http://idsa.in/system/files/Monograph19.pdf&ei=Dzs1VfzTOM-
wogSLlICwCA&usg=AFQjCNHudwoGTciO3qqjDStFma86BItJaQ&sig2=6gLzPs65BX1-
SyG4STdbUw&bvm=bv.91071109,d.b2w. 
21
 Arif, Sheikh Mohd. "A History of Sino-Indian Relations: From Conflict to Cooperation."International Journal of 
Political Science and Development 4 (2013): 129-37. 
http://www.academicresearchjournals.org/IJPSD/PDF/December/Arif.pdf. 
22
 Southerland, Matthew, Iacob Koch-Weser, and Angela Zhang. "China-India Relations: Tensions Persist Despite 
Growing Cooperation." U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Report, 2014. 
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff Report_China-India Relations--Tensions Persist 
Despite Growing Cooperation_12 22 2014.pdf. 
23
 Das, Rup Narayan. "India-China Relations A New Paradigm." Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, 2013. 
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCEQFjAA&ur
l=http://idsa.in/system/files/Monograph19.pdf&ei=Dzs1VfzTOM-
wogSLlICwCA&usg=AFQjCNHudwoGTciO3qqjDStFma86BItJaQ&sig2=6gLzPs65BX1-
SyG4STdbUw&bvm=bv.91071109,d.b2w. 
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control over the same water source. In this way China‘s own plans to increase their supply of 
potable water as a means to maintain domestic stability may instead jeopardize their political ties 
with regional neighbors.  
1.6 Implications for Sino-U.S. Relations 
 Finally, it is important to briefly analyze the implications of China‘s current water 
shortages on Sino-U.S. relations, as the United States-China relationship is currently the most 
important bilateral relationship in the international community. Overall, the impact of Chinese 
water shortages on Sino-U.S. relations is threefold.  
 First, chronic water shortages in China will likely have an impact on the two countries‘ 
economic relations. As discussed earlier in this chapter, water shortages will probably make 
China a less attractive market for foreign investment, and will also impact China‘s 
manufacturing sector that is highly dependent on coal based energy. The United States as 
China‘s biggest trading partner would potentially feel the economic impact of a drop in Chinese 
manufacturing, particularly of a drop in manufactured goods typically exported to the United 
States.  China‘s inability to maintain its natural resources may also drive certain U.S. companies 
to start to invest in countries other than China.  
 Secondly, In terms of regional security, the United States has a vested interest in 
maintaining the regional stability of East Asia.
24
 Should China‘s central government be unable to 
sufficiently solve current water shortages, or pursue plan of water development that their 
neighbors perceive as overly aggressive it is possible that a water war could erupt in East Asia. 
An international conflict over water in Asia has the potential to escalate and disrupt the balance 
                                                          
24
 Southerland, Matthew, Iacob Koch-Weser, and Angela Zhang. "China-India Relations: Tensions Persist Despite 
Growing Cooperation." U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Report, 2014. 
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff Report_China-India Relations--Tensions Persist 
Despite Growing Cooperation_12 22 2014.pdf. 
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of power in the region. As many of the United States‘ largest trading partners and important 
allies are located in the region, as well as the United States‘ strong military presence in the 
Pacific, a regional conflict over resources such as water would have a large impact on United 
States‘ foreign policy.25  
 Finally, should the three projects discussed in this paper prove to be insufficient in 
supplying China with water a continued supply of water, it is possible that China may begin to 
seek out relationships with other countries in order to secure a partnership to provide access to 
potable water. Should China pursue such a policy of expanding their global hegemony as a 
means of securing access to other countries‘ water resources, this would likely affect Sino-U.S. 
relations, as such an increase in China‘s global influence may be perceived as a potential threat 
to the United States‘ soft power.  
1.7 Chapter Conclusions 
 Overall, this chapter provides a background on the extent of the water shortages currently 
facing China, as well as provides brief explanation as to the possible of the business, diplomatic, 
and security repercussions if China‘s central government fails to reverse current urban potable 
water scarcity. Although the repercussions and scenarios discussed in this chapter are not 
necessarily the primary focus of this paper, they are still relevant as they provide a context for 
the severity of the problem, which China is attempting to address with the three projects 
examined in the remaining chapters. This chapter should provide the context for why China‘s 
central government has so heavily invested in multiple attempted solutions aimed at reducing 
potable water shortages, and the possible stakes at risk should these projects fail. 
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CHAPTER 2: SOUTH NORTH RIVER TRANSFER PROJECT 
2.1 SNRT Project Background 
Image 1
26
    South North River Transfer Project Map 
 
 China‘s SNRT project is divided into three major sections (Image 1), the eastern and 
central routes that have already been completed, and the western route set for completion in 
2050.
27
  The ultimate goal of the project is to redirect approximately 44.8 billion cubic meters of 
fresh water from the Yangtze River in Southern China, to the water stressed region of Northern 
                                                          
26
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China.
28
 The project is allegedly based on a 1952 quote from Mao Zedong ―there is plenty of 
water in the south, not much water in the north, if at all possible; borrowing some water would 
be good.‖29 This reengineering of China‘s geographically unequal distribution of water 
represents one of the world‘s largest and most expensive engineering projects.30    
Image 2
31
          SNRT Project Eastern Route  
 
 Construction of the eastern route of the project (Image 2) was completed in 2013.
32
 The 
route consists primarily of an upgrade to China‘s Grand Canal and increasing the amount of 
                                                          
28
 Freeman, Carla. "Quenching the Dragon's Thirst: The South-North Water Transfer Project—Old Plumbing for 
New China?" Wilson Center.  
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Quenching%20the%20Dragon%25E2%2580%2599s%20Thirst.pdf  
29
 Guerringue, Brett. "South - North Water Transfer Project." ICE Case Studies, no. 277 (2013). 
http://www1.american.edu/ted/ICE/north-china.html. 
30
 Keith Schneider, ―Choke Point: China – Confronting water scarcity and energy demand in the world‘s largest 
country,‖ Circle of Blue, February 15, 2011, available athttp://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2011/world/choke-
point-chinaconfronting-water-scarcity-and-energy-demand-in-the-worlds-largest-country/ 
31
 I"South-North Water Transfer Project." International Rivers. http://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/south-
north-water-transfer-project 
32
 Buckley, Chris. "A Quiet Start to South-North Water Transfer." The New York Times, December 11, 2013. 
http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/11/a-quiet-start-to-south-north-water-transfer/. 
17 
 
water drawn from the Yangtze River into the Jiangdu canal.
33
 The water is then transferred 
through multiple pumping stations along the Grand Canal, through a tunnel constructed under the 
Yellow River and finally into reservoirs near the city of Tianjin.
34
 In total, the eastern route of 
the SNRT project is just over 1,152 km long, with 23 pumping stations and a power capacity of 
454 megawatts.
35
  
Image 3
36
          SNRT Project Central Route  
 
 The central route of the SNRT project (Image 3) which began operation in December 
2014 is designed to divert water from the Yangtze River to Beijing.
37
 The route runs from the 
Danjiangkou Reservoir on the Han River, a tributary of the Yangze River, to China‘s capital city 
                                                          
33
 "Eastern Route Project (ERP)." Office of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project Commission of the State 
Council. http://www.nsbd.gov.cn/zx/english/erp.htm. 
34
 Ibid.,1 
35
 Bossard, Peter. "South-North Water Transfer Project." International Rivers. 
http://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/south-north-water-transfer-project 
36
 Yardley, Jim. "Beneath Booming Cities, China's Future Is Drying Up." The New York Times. September 28, 
2007. http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/beneath-booming-cities-china-s-future-is-drying-up-2977. 
37
 Yeager-Kozacek, Codi. "China Completes Second Line of South-North Water Transfer Project - Circle of Blue 
WaterNews." Circle of Blue WaterNews. January 8, 2015. 
http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2015/world/photo-slideshow-china-completes-second-line-south-north-
water-transfer/. 
18 
 
of Beijing.
38
 The 1,264 km long canal was constructed in such a way that water was able to flow 
down from the Danjiangkou Reservoir to Beijing via gravity without the need to construct 
pumping stations. However, the route did require the construction of a tunnel to allow water to 
flow under the Yellow River.
39
  The plan included raising the height of the Danjiangkou Dam 
from 162 m to 176.6 m above sea level, in order to increase the reservoir‘s overall water level.40  
Image 4
41
            SNRT Project Western Route  
 
 The western route (Image 4) the final stage of the SNRT project, is currently in the 
planning stages is expected to be completed by 2050.
42
 The western route will divert water from 
the Tongtian, Yalong, and Dadu rivers, tributaries of the Yangtze, to the Yellow River.
43
 To 
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complete the route multiple dams, tunnels, and canals will need to be constructed.
44
 The 
Tongtian line will be 289 km long, the Dadu line will be 30 km, and the Yalong line will be 131 
km.
45
 Overall the route is planned to divert 3.8 billion m
3
 of water across the Bayankala 
Mountains to Northwestern China.
46
 
 Although this paper will reference the environmental and financial impact incurred by the 
SNRT project as a whole, the majority of this paper will focus on the impact of the central route 
completed December 2014.  Since the central route supplies water directly to Beijing, it is 
comparable to desalination and the IBT pricing scheme both of which are also aimed at bringing 
relief to Beijing‘s water shortages.  Overall, the central route is the section of the SNRT project 
which best exemplifies the impact of the SNRT project on China‘s urban residential water usage, 
the primary focus of this research.  
2.2 SNRT Project Distributional Equality 
Relocation:  
 The central route of the SNRT project required the relocation of 300,000 residents from 
Hebei province, whose houses and property were submerged once the route became 
operational.
47
 Residents had the option either to retreat from the rising water while still staying in 
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the same county, or relocate to a new town or city outside the county.
48
  Although this decision 
was supposed to be left up to the individual residents, local officials came under criticisms for 
pressuring residents to relocate outside the county rather than simply retreat.
49
 
 This pressure to relocate outside their home county is likely the result of lessons learned 
from the Three Gorges Dam relocation process. During the construction of the Three Gorges 
Dam, roughly a million residents lost their homes, with the vast majority of them choosing to 
retreat and remain in Wushan County.
50
  The biggest problem that arose during this relocation 
process was an insufficient amount of land within Wushan County to allow the large number 
displaced residents to be able to stay within the county make a living by means of agriculture.
51
  
Local governments hope that by forcing residents, displaced by the central route of the SNRT 
project, to relocate outside their current county, these residents will have access to better job 
opportunities, more land, and will lower the risk of potential water pollution.
52
  
 The local governments compensated displaced residents.
53
 According to government 
officials, each resident‘s compensation package was different, based off a formula that took into 
account former land holdings and the value of resident‘s former home.54 In general the standard 
relocation package included a newly built home, 0.1 hector of land, and an annual stipend of 
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roughly 600 RMB (88 USD) per person for 20 years.
55
 Relocated residents often left behind 
house that they built themselves.
56
 Many complained that the government erected their new 
homes too quickly, and there are multiple reports of shoddy construction, including cracked 
foundations.
57
Additionally, the 0.1 hectors of land was often much less than the amount of land 
residents been forced to give up. Such small plots of land, often in worse soil conditions did not 
allow for the majority of residents to be able to continue with the type of agriculture they had 
been pursuing prior to their relocation.
58
 Residents who relocated to new towns also often faced 
social tensions and were unwelcome by their new neighbors.
59
 Such unsatisfactory compensation 
has resulted in violent outbursts between migrants and local residents, as well as ―demonstrations 
in Qianjiang by migrants protesting‖ the government‘s insufficient compensation.60  
 Despite the seemingly generous opportunity offered to residents through relocation, many 
in Hebei were reluctant to leave. Relocation, for many residents meant the end of an agrarian 
lifestyle that they had enjoyed for generations.
61
 Additionally, once relocated residents will no 
longer be able to pay proper respects to their ancestors, for even those graves that were not 
submerged became too far of a journey for family members to make once they had relocated 
outside the province.
62
 Finally, perhaps the largest concern of those relocatin is the loss in 
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―guanxi‖ or relationships.63  Relocating for majority of residents meant permanent separation 
from kinship networks and other local friendship networks, which they have developed over their 
lifetime.
64
  Many residents worried that they would not be able to replicate such relationships 
once they had relocated to more urban areas, fearing urban lifestyles would be too impersonal.
65
   
 Even those residents retreating to a new rural environment within their home province, 
still faced the prospect of adapting to unfamiliar land, learning to have to grow new crops, and 
losing the expertise they have developed over a lifetime.
66
 Additionally, those who remain near 
the water source face the added challenge of a ban on pesticides and other chemicals, a measure 
meant to decrease the threat of pollution to the water source.
67
  As a result of these struggles, 
regardless of whether the residents relocated to an urban environment, or simply retreated further 
into the same county, both groups still faced large challenges that required them to completely 
change their lifestyle.  Overall, the relocation processes embodies the distributional inequality of 
the central route of the SNRT project, as thousands of South China residents were forced to 
sacrifice to help provide their northern counterparts with a supply of potable water.  
South to Sacrifice for the North:  
 Slogans such as ―supporting the south-north water diversion is an unshakable duty,‖ 
―ensure clean water gets to Beijing,‖ and ―sacrifice the small family for the big family,‖ all make 
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clear the fundamental distributional inequality of the construction of the SNRT project.
68
 The 
central route of the SNRT project forces the South to bear the burden of sacrifice for the water 
scarce north.
69
 Overall, the South is sacrificing ―44.8 billion cubic meters of water per year from 
the Yangtze River in southern China to the Yellow River Basin in arid northern China.‖70 
Although it is Northern China that will experience the potential benefits of the SNRT project‘s 
central route, Southern China will not remain unaffected. As will be discussed later on in the 
chapter, large amount of diverted water will affect, not only the many residents of Southern 
China displaced by the project, but also ecosystems and industry located in the South.    
2.3 SNRT Political Feasibility: 
Official Opposition:  
 There can be little doubt that the SNRT project is controversial. There have been those 
who applauded China‘s ingenuity in attempting to overcome natural geographic water disparities, 
while at the same time there have also been those who opposed the project as it poses a large 
environmental threat to multiple river ecosystems and increases the risk of pollution because of 
the redirection of water through new channels and reservoirs
71
. Finally, there have been those 
who at every stage have questioned whether this project with its large price tag, will even truly 
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be effective at relieving water shortages in Northern China, and suggest that perhaps the money 
would have been better invested into projects that encourage water conservation or more 
effective conversion of wastewater.
72
  
 What is surprising is that many officials in China have voiced publicly their criticisms of 
the project. Ma Jun the director of China‘s Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs 
(IPE),  Zhang Jinsong the deputy director of the Jiangsu office of the SNRT project, and Zou 
Qingping the deputy chief of the Hubei Province bureau of environmental protection, have all 
publicly voiced their concerns over the central route of the SNRT project, particularly their 
reservations over the project‘s environmental impact, yet those higher up in the party such as 
premier Li Keqiang, current president Xi Jinping, and former president Hu Jintao have all 
professed their continued support for the project since its start in 2002.
73
  Overall, the finer points 
of these officials‘ support or opposition are less important than the fact that within the 
authoritarian state that is China, there exists such a vocal opposition to a state sponsored project.  
It is likely that these disagreements among public officials are due to the magnitude of the SNRT 
project, and therefore the magnitude of associated risks and benefits. 
 It is important to note two aspects of this official discontent with the project. First, 
although there have been those officials who have publically disagreed with the SNRT project, 
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their criticisms have not affected and likely will not affect the continuation or completion of the 
project. This is because those who have publicly disagreed with the project are largely a small 
minority of officials, and typically do not hold very ranking positions.
74
 Therefore, though there 
are officials who have expressed reservations over the continuation of the project they did not 
affect ultimate the competition of the central route nor will they likely noticeably impact the 
construction of the remaining western route.  
 Secondly, among those officials who disagree with the SNRT project, their criticism for 
the most part revolves around the project‘s environmental impact. Though the environmental 
impacts of the three routes are disputed, what is not disputed is the need for China to solve its 
current urban residential water shortages. Northern China is currently using water at an 
―unsustainable rate.‖75 Beijing, with an average annual water supply of only 100 m3 per person, 
suffers from a water scarcity that is on par with Saudi Arabia.
76
  Therefore, though Chinese 
officials may to some extent debate the environmental costs of the SNRT project, they are not 
necessarily denying that the state should intervene to reverse national water shortages. The extent 
of the water scarcity in Northern China, is likely enough to overcome the majority officials‘ 
reservations on the potential negative environmental impacts of the SNRT project, which will 
therefore likely not impede the political feasibility of the project going forward.  
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National Pride:  
 In successfully completing this project, China‘s central government has the opportunity 
to once again lay claim to having constructed the world‘s largest engineering project.77 The 
successful completion of the SNRT project will no doubt be a source of national pride for 
China‘s central government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP will have 
redirected nature in an attempt to overcome chronic water shortages in Northern China.
78
  As this 
particular project is potentially, an object of national pride it only increases the political pressure 
to successfully complete the SNRT project. Although many consider the project controversial, 
once the central government committed to starting the project in 2002, despite the multiple 
delays and overages in the budget, all three sections are still likely to be completed.
79
 This is 
likely because the SNRT project will be a testament to the efficiency of China‘s central 
government. The central government may hope to be able to inspire national pride by 
undertaking a massive feat of engineering so as to overcome natural geographic water shortages 
in China, demonstrating that even forces of nature can be bent to their will.   
Continued Delays in Construction:  
 Thus far, both of the completed segments of the SNRT project, the eastern and central 
routes have been delayed well past their expected completion dates.
80
 Construction on the 
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project‘s central route began in December of 2003.81 Although the project was originally set for 
completion by the start of the Beijing Olympics in August 2008, the route did not become 
operational until December 2014.
82
 The hope originally was that the central route would be able 
to supply Beijing with a much needed increase in potable water prior to the start of the 2008 
games.
83
 However, by September 2008 construction had only been completed on 307 km of the 
1,267 km route.
84
 The project was then on track to be finished by 2010, but was delayed again 
until 2014 because unforeseen environmental concerns, which required the expansion of the 
Danjiangkou reservoir.
85
 
 What these continued delays in construction demonstrate is that China‘s central 
government has vastly under estimated the amount of time needed to complete a set of such 
massive engineering projects.
86
 Additionally, the environmental impact of the project has been 
the aspect of the SNRT project that the central government appears to have most overlooked and 
has resulted in the greatest amount of delays. For in both the eastern and central routes, the need 
to postpone the projects‘ completion in order to try to mitigate unanticipated environmental 
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consequences have caused the projects‘ the longest delays.87 Due to these long delays, overall the 
SNRT project will likely continue to drain the central government‘s budget well through 2050.88  
2.4 SNRT Project Cost Effectiveness: 
Over Budget:  
 Originally, the budget for the entire SNRT project was 53.7 billion RMB. However, 
China‘s central government has already surpassed this with the final construction cost of the 
eastern and central routes totaling approximately 254.6 billion RMB (37.44 billion USD).
89
 The 
cost of the SNRT project is likely only to increase as the construction continues on the western 
route of the project through 2050.  The final total cost of the SNRT project is now estimated to 
be approximately 79.4 billion USD, more than twice the cost of the Three Gorges Dam.
90
 This is 
not only one of the largest, but also one of the most expensive engineering projects a country has 
ever undertaken.
91
  This ever-increasing budget‘s failure to thus far derail the completion of the 
SNRT project demonstrates the central government‘s commitment to solving the current water 
shortages in Northern China, particularly in cities such as Beijing. 
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Negative Impact on Local GDPs:  
 The central government‘s massive budget for the project fails to take into account the 
additional costs borne by local governments, many of which will face notable decreases in local 
GDPs as a result of the SNRT project. Such decreases in local GDPs are not only the result of 
reductions in arable land due to flooding to expand reservoirs, but also because of the increased 
environmental regulations put in place to protect the water supply.
92
 The new regulations that 
include restrictions on both local agricultural and industry pollution have forced multiple local 
governments along the route of the SNRT project, to sacrifice economic development for 
environmental protection.
93
 Some local governments, such as China‘s Shennongjia district, have 
asked for ―financial subsidies to make up for potential losses in local GDP.‖94 Though local 
governments have yet to receive any such subsidies, the case of Shennonjia indicates financial 
costs incurred by local governments because of SNRT project.  
Money Diverted From Conservation:  
 The money the CCP has invested, and will continue to invest in the SNRT project 
represents money that will not be available to invest into water conservation in China. In fact, 
some experts believe that were the money instead invested into better waste management 
facilities, rainwater collection, and other projects geared towards water conservation, it is 
possible that mega cities, such as Beijing, could solve or significantly decrease current potable 
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water shortages.
95
 By choosing to pursue this massive engineering project, China‘s central 
government has demonstrated its commitment to a supply-driven rather than a demand-driven 
method for solving water shortages. However, focusing on increasing the supply of potable water 
rather than decreasing the demand for water has thus far proved to be a more expensive and 
environmentally harmful method of combating water shortages in China.  
An Incomplete Solution:   
 Although the SNRT project is divided into three different major sections, problems 
caused by the project, have forced the central government to invest even more money into 
multiple additional minor water projects.
96
 One example of this occurred upon completion of the 
central route of the SNRT project. The central routed caused the water level of the Han River to 
fall.
97
  This falling water level will likely have a large impact on fishing, transportation, and 
agricultural production in multiple villages that depend on the Han River for their livelihood.
98
  
As a result, a ―10-billion-yuan package of minor projects have been formulated to reduce the 
impact of the water diversion projects on the Han River.‖99 The main aspect of this additional 
minor project will consist of  the construction of a 67 km man made canal that will give the Han 
river access to water from the Yangtze river, in order to supplement for water lost as a result of 
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the SNRT project.
100
  This 10 billion yuan construction package is likely just the first of many 
more packages that the government will have to invest in order to alleviate problems created by 
the SNRT project. The cost of these minor projects will be in addition to 254.6 billion RMB 
already spent on the construction of the central and eastern routes.
101
 Demonstrating that in terms 
of cost effectiveness, the construction of the SNRT project, as thus far been little more than a 
continual drain on the budgets of both the central and local governments.   
2.5 SNRT Environmental Impact: 
Increased Pollution in the South:  
 One of the largest shortfalls of the central route of the SNRT project is that the design of 
the project increases the likelihood that the supply of the water diverted by the project becomes 
polluted. As stated earlier, central route siphons water from China‘sYangtze River in order to 
supplement the Han River.
102
  By diverting the water of the Yangtze River water down unnatural 
channels, the central route lowered the water level of the Yangtze River.
103
 Lower water levels, 
leave the Yangtze River more susceptible to pollution, since there is now simply less water in the 
river to dilute polluted waste and run-off.
104
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 At present approximately 40% of the China‘s wastewater is dumped into the Yangtze 
River.
105
 The completion of the central route of the SNRT project will make this pollution more 
toxic by leaving less water in the Yangtze River dilute it. This will likely have adverse effects on 
the biodiversity of the Yangtze River, as well as on agricultural production conducted near the 
river, and on residents who depend on water from the Yangtze River.
106
 Though the underlying 
cause of the water pollution does not necessarily lie with the SNRT project, the construction of 
the central route further exacerbated the problem, increasing the threat of water pollution in 
Southern China.
107
  
Increased potential for Pollution in the North:  
 When the central route of the SNRT project became operational, the water level of the 
river in Xiangyang City, the first big city downstream from the Danjiangkou Dam, dropped by 
41 cm and could continue to drop to as much as 78 cm.
108
  The lowering the river‘s water level 
will likely have a range of adverse environmental consequences. One example of this is the one 
third of fish species that could now face extinction, because of threats to winter breeding grounds, 
increased levels of pollution, and temperature changes in the water.
109
  
 As in Southern China, lower water levels in Northern China make it more difficult for 
rivers to be able to clean themselves, and pollution levels will likely become more toxic 
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overtime.
110
 Unless the government implements proper management of that stretch of the river, a 
range of environmental and ecological problems could arise.
111
 Additionally, the amount of time 
during which the river would be navigable could decrease making water transportation less 
efficient and shipping more costly.
112
  
 These harmful environmental consequences of the central route of the SNRT project on 
this segment of the river, also increases the likelihood that the water that eventually reaches cities 
such as Beijing, will likely be undrinkable because of high level of pollution.
113
 Furthermore, 
this demonstrates that the damaging environmental and ecological impacts of this route of the 
SNRT project are not limited to Southern China, but like the water from the project will flow 
North affecting cities such as Beijing.
114
   
The SNRT Project Does Not Create Clean Water:  
 The central route of the SNRT project does provide Northern China with increased 
amounts of water; however, this project does not guarantee the quality of the diverted water.
115
 It 
is not enough to simply supply cities with a high quantity of water if the quality of the water is 
highly polluted and ultimately unpotable. As discussed earlier, the central route of the SNRT 
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project increases the susceptibility of the diverted water to pollution.
116
  Overall, the SNRT 
project  demonstrates the focus of the central government on increasing water quantity rather 
than water quality.   
 There are very few mechanisms in place within the project, which guarantees that the 
water diverted to Northern cites, meets minimum baseline quality standards.
117
 The government 
has put some mechanism in place along the central route to help prevent water pollution, 
including constructing an ecological forest preserve of some 356,667 ha (881,342 acres) around 
the Danjiangkou reservoir; establishing erosion control measures throughout 680 ha (1,680 acres) 
immediately surrounding the reservoir; and shutting down more than 800 small, but heavily 
polluting businesses.
118
 However, these measures are preventive rather than proactive in nature. 
They allow the government to stop further pollution of the water, but do not have the means to 
clean water that has already been polluted by the time it is diverted by the central route of the 
SNRT project.  
 Additionally, the responsibility for purifying the water, and bearing the costs of 
constructing and maintaining water cleaning faculties has fallen to the shoulders of the local 
governments of towns and cities in North China.
119
 Many of these local governments have begun 
to balk at the high price tag associated with purifying the water diverted from the SNRT 
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project.
120
 Therefore, though the central route of the SNRT project to some extent solves the 
water scarcity in numerical terms, it fails to address the problem of water pollution, an issue that 
is intricately intertwined with issue of water scarcity in China.  
2.6 SNRT Project Overall Conclusion: 
The Amount of Water Provided:  
Table 1
121
    Beijing’s Total Water Resources 
Water resource Billion cubic meter per year Remarks 
Groundwater 2.0 
 
Local Rivers 1.0 Variable 
Reclaimed Water 0.3 Estimated 
South-North Water Transfer 0.3 
Northern Section of Central Route 
Total 3.6 
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 The data from Table 1 shows the breakdown of the total water resources available to 
Beijing after the competition of the central route of the SNRT project.
122
 These numbers are 
based on projections of the total water resources available to Beijing in 2014, after the SNRT 
project‘s central route begins operation in 2015.123 If the projected 3.6 billion m3 per year were 
divided by Beijing‘s population of approximately 21 million in 2014, the amount of water 
available annually to individual Beijing residents would be approximately 170 m
3
.
124
 Such a low 
annual per capita water level would place Beijing in a state of water stress according to United 
Nations‘ standards.125 This data would suggest, that the central route of the SNRT project will 
likely be inadequate in solving Beijing‘s current water scarcity. Diverted water from the South is 
simply insufficient to quench Beijing‘s massive thirst for potable water.   
Increasing Population Pressures:  
 Perhaps the biggest shortfall of the SNRT project is that once the project is complete, 
China‘s central government cannot increase the capacity of water transferred by project in order 
to meet the demands of rising population pressures in cities such as Beijing.  Beijing‘s 
population in 2010 was 19.6 million people, and by 2020, the population is projected to increase 
by 20% to reach upward of 25 million.
126
  Increasing population pressure will only further 
exacerbate Beijing‘s current level of water stress. Though the SNRT project will help to alleviate 
some of the water stress experienced by Northern Chinese cities such as Beijing and Tianjin, 
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once the project begins to operate at full capacity, this massive engineering project cannot be 
expanded to increase water flow in order to meet the pressures of raising urban populations.
127
  
Water Shortages in Southern China:   
  The 9.5 billion gallons of water supplied annually to Northern China by the central route 
of the SNRT project represents water diverted from Southern China to meet the needs of 
Northern China.
128
 This water supplied to Northern China is water that is now unavailable to 
those in Southern China. Historically, Southern China has not suffered from the water shortages 
that plague Northern Chinese cities.
129
 This is basis of the reasoning behind the SNRT plan, first 
suggested by Mao Zedong in the 1950s as a simple solution to China‘s natural water disparity by 
the having, the South ―share‖ their excess water with the North.130  
  However, there are two fundamental problems with Mao‘s logic. The first is that though 
three fifths of China‘s water is located in the South, China‘s rapid industrialization has increased 
water pollution and left a large proportion of this water unsuitable for transfer to Northern 
China.
131
 As already discussed, SNRT project compounds these pollution problems because of 
the increased risk for pollution along the newly constructed channels.
132
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  The second flaw of this plan is that the majority of the water diverted by the central route 
comes from China‘s Yangtze River, and there is fear this this project may overstretch the 
capacity of the Yangtze River.
133
 Prior to the start of the construction of the central route, many 
areas along the Yangtze had already begun experience water shortages.
134
  Cities and towns 
along the Yangtze that have historically prepared for the impact of the flooding of the Yangtze 
River on their communities, are now facing a new unforeseen disaster of drought.
135
 According 
to local officials in 2007 the town of Tongling located on the Yangtze River, experienced its 
worst drought in over 30 years.
136
   
 According to China‘s National Bureau of Statistics, the cities located along the Yangtze 
River account for 41% of China‘s total GDP.137  The Yangtze threads its way through 11 
different regions in China, and since China‘s opening up and reform policy (改革开放) water 
from the Yangtze has been intensively siphoned off for factories, hydroelectric schemes and 
agriculture.
138
 The result is that water levels of the Yangtze River have continued to drop, 
leading some experts to predict that further water diversions of SNRT project will result in water 
shortages in Southern China.
139
 A project, which attempts to solve water shortages in the North 
at the cost of potentially creating shortages in the South, is not a viable long-term solution to 
water scarcity in China. Though China's water is inequitably distributed geographically, the 
solution is not to attempt to reengineer nature to redistribute the water, but rather to focus on 
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conservation, and perhaps adapt to the country‘s geography by relocating more water intensive 
industries to Southern China.   
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CHAPTER 3: IBT PRICING SCHEME 
3.1 IBT Pricing Scheme Project Background: 
 The CCP designed China's IBT water pricing scheme in order to ―punish‖ intensive water 
users by raising their rates, while also slowing down the rate of water usage ―in the face of rising 
urbanism.‖140 This tiered pricing system would charge urban residents based off their 
monthly water consumption as compared to the national average household rate of 
consumption.
141
 Overall, the first, second and third tier will follow a pricing ratio of 
1:1.5:3.
142
 Those households whose consumption rate is not more than 80% of the 
national average household rate of consumption are part of the first tier and will not have 
their water rates increased.
143
 Those residents who use between 80% and 95% of the 
national average household rate of consumption will comprise the second tier and 
households who use more than 95% will be part of the third tier.
144
 Those in the third tier 
will pay three times the base rate for water, and those in the second will pay one and a 
half times the base rate.
145
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Table 2
146
     Guangzhou IBT Pricing Outline 
Residential Volume (m
3
) Guangzhou Water Tariff Pricing  
RMB USD 
0-12 1.98 0.33 
12-26 1.98 0.33 
27-34 2.97 0.49 
34-43 3.96 0.65 
>43 3.96 0.65 
>62 3.96 0.65 
 
 China‘s central government introduced a pilot IBT pricing program in Guangzhou 
in 2008, using the rates outlined in Table 2.
147
 According to official reports, since the 
programs implementation residential water consumption in Guangzhou has fallen 8% .
148
  
When the IBT pricing scheme was implemented in Guangzhou the base rate tariff for 
water was 1.98 RMB per cubic meter of water (Table 2).
149
 The ―switch point‖ between 
the tier one and tier three, was set at a rate of about 25% above the median consumption 
rate (Table 2).
150
 The central government has expanded the plan, implementing it in other 
major cities, such as Shanghai and Beijing.
151
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 On January 3, 2014 China‘s National Development and Reform Council (NDRC) and the 
Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) announced that they were 
issuing a document outlining the three tiered water tariff system to be implemented in all 
Chinese cities by the end of 2015.
152
 According to their statement, the IBT pricing system is 
meant to ―promote sustainable use of water resources and to help conserve water amongst urban 
residents.‖153 The document released by the NDRC stated that the pricing scheme would be 
implemented under ―strict supervision‖ but that adjustments will be made as necessary, and the 
―monitoring process will be transparent.‖154 
3.2 Distributional Equality of the IBT Pricing Scheme 
North South Distributional Inequality:   
 The NDRC‘s plan to implement the IBT pricing scheme in all Chinese cities by the end 
of 2015, as part of a plan to curb both residential urban water usage,  divides China more in 
terms of east and west (along China‘s relative urban rural divide) rather than dividing it by north 
and south (along China‘s water shortage).  
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Image 5     China Water Scarcity Map 
 
 Once the IBT plan has been fully implemented, Chinese cities will all be subject to 
relatively the same water-pricing scheme. This is intriguing as not all cities in China suffer from 
the same severity of water shortages. Water scarcity and shortages have historically always been 
more of a problem in Northern China, than in Southern China.
155
 Although the majority of cities 
in China have experienced increased pressure placed on water supplies as a result of rapid 
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urbanization, the level of water scarcity differs between cities in Northern and Southern China 
(Image 5).
156
  
 Nationally the level of water scarcity is inconsistent across China (Image 5). For this 
reason the adoption of a single plan for all cities, though undoubtedly better than no change in 
the current water pricing system, does not incorporate enough flexibility for  individual cities to 
be able to adopt  and adapt  pricing schemes to take into account unique factors  that affect each 
city‘s individual levels of water scarcity. The adoption of  more localized versions of the IBT 
pricing scheme would allow for the development of pricing schemes that would better reflect the 
use of water as a limited resource in that particular region.  
Impact on Urban Residents: 
 In terms of distributional equality, the most unequal aspect of China's new IBT plan is 
that it fails to include China‘s rural areas.  However, this urban-rural disparity is not necessarily a 
debilitating weakness of the plan, nor does it affect the potential conservation benefits of the plan 
in China‘s urban areas. China's urban rural gap is simply too large for the adoption of a single 
national IBT pricing scheme to be affective. China‘s urban and rural communities differ greatly 
in their use of water, particularly in terms of rural communities‘ heavy dependence on water for 
irrigation and agricultural.
157
 It would simply be too difficult design a single water pricing policy 
that was able to reconcile such difference in water consumption.  
  China's current IBT pricing scheme has been designed specifically for use in China‘s 
urban areas. This means although China‘s rural areas will fail to experience any of the 
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conservation benefits associated with new pricing scheme, it is unlikely that an IBT pricing 
scheme designed for implementation in urban areas would be successful in rural China. 
Therefore, the urban-rural distributional inequality is not necessarily a weakness of the IBT 
pricing scheme, but a necessity dictated by China‘s social dichotomy.  
Distributional Equality within the Cities:  
 After the implementation of the IBT water-pricing scheme in China‘s urban areas, the 
burden paying for of rising water costs will be unequal distributed among residents. Those in the 
top 5% of water users (residents in the top tier of the IBT scheme) will see their water rates 
raised to triple the base rate paid by the majority of urban residents.
158
 The central government 
may have unequally distribution of the costs of increased water tariffs, in order to strike a 
balance between increasing prices to reflect the reality of water scarcity in China, while at the 
same time protecting social stability by not increasing the financial burden of water on the 
majority of urban residents.  
 The IBT pricing scheme is unlikely to pose a threat to social stability so long as the 
majority of urbans residents‘ water tariffs constitute less than 3% of household‘s annual 
incomes.
159
 The 3% threshold for social stability is from a study conducted by China‘s Ministry 
of Construction.
160
 This study stated that if water expenditure was held to 1% or less, households 
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would have little to no reaction to the change in water pricing policy, at 2% households would 
begin to ―become more aware of water usage,‖ while 3% was designated the threshold at which 
―water expenditure is too large to exceed the affordability of household.‖161 When this data is 
compared to China‘s pricing scheme, where those in the top tier would be charged prices that 
account for approximately 2.4% of household income, even those in the top tier of the new 
pricing scheme should still fall below the 3% threshold.
162
 According to this data, the probability 
of increasing water-pricing leading to the threshold of large-scale urban social unrest is relatively 
low.    
 Additionally, the Chinese government views access water as an inherent right of the 
population, a viewed shared by the majority of people in China.
163
 As an inherent right, water 
must be an affordable resource, and should not be a financial strain for the average Chinese 
household. Due to this belief in the right to water, it is unlikely that the Chinese government will 
raise prices on the bottom tier as doing so would mean raising prices on 80% of urban residents, 
violating their perceived right to inexpensive water, and in doing so perhaps posing a threat to 
social stability. 
 The unequitable distribution of water tariffs is rational, as water is an essential element of 
daily life in China and drastically increasing the majority of urban residents' water tariffs would 
likely result in adverse political, social and economic consequences.
164
 China's implementation 
of a new IBT scheme plan seeks to increase urban residents' awareness as to the current state of 
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water shortages, while placing the finical burden on only a small segment of China‘s urban 
population to avoid such threats unrest. 
The Relationship Income and Support:  
 A report submitted to the World Bank by Zhang Shiqiu, Deng Liangchun, Yue Peng, Cui 
Huishan from Beijing University‘s College of Environmental Studies and engineering, lays out 
data that suggests that there is a relationship between household income and support for an IBT 
pricing system.
165
 Of the 200 households surveyed in Beijing, when asked which aspect of water 
they ―care the most about,‖ 50% of households‘ whose monthly income was less than 100 RMB 
person,  indicated that price was most important.
166
 This percentage steadily decreases as the 
households‘ income increases with only 26.9% of households‘ earning more than 5000 RMB per 
month indicating that price was most important.
167
  
 Table 3
168
    Beijing Resident Water Survey Continued  
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 There are two overall conclusions drawn from Table 3. First, it is clear that residents in 
all income categories perceive water quality to be a more important issue than water pricing.
169
 
This would imply that for any plan the government wishes to implement that affects residential 
water supply, linking the potential plan with improving residential water quality would likely 
increase the amount of popular support the plan would receive.  
Table 4
170
 
 
 Secondly, there appears to be at least a loose relationship between household income and 
concern with water prices.
171
 Lower income families tend to be more concerned with water 
prices than those with higher monthly incomes do.
172
 This is unsurprising as water represents a 
greater financial burden for lower income families. This coupled with the data displayed in Table 
4 indicates that lower income families are less likely to be supportive of water pricing reform. 
This again is logical as lower income families likely worry more about the potential financial 
burden of increasing water pricings. However, China‘s IBT pricing system appears to reflect this 
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concern for lower income families, as it is likely that the majority of them will not have their 
water rates increased even after  all cities have implemented the IBT pricing scheme.   
3.3 IBT Pricing Political Feasibility: 
Factors of Feasibility:   
 As stated earlier, China‘s central government through the NDRC has set forth guidelines 
outlining China‘s new IBT pricing scheme, and has stated that the plan, which has already been 
implemented in some of China‘s largest cities, will be implemented in all cities in China by the 
end of 2015
173
. There are numerous factors in play that suggest this program will be successfully 
expanded to all cites by the NDRC‘s self-imposed 2015 deadline. This includes the efficiency 
with which the Chinese government has in the past been able to implement nationwide reforms, 
due to the centralized nature of China‘s authoritarian government. Additionally, since the 
majority of residents in the cites where the plan is set to be implemented will experience no 
change in their current water tariff, there is little impetus for citizens to resist or impede the 
plan‘s implementation. Finally, as will be discussed in depth later in this chapter, Chinese local 
officials now have direct incentive from the central committee to ensure reforms in water 
management policy are fully implemented. All of these factors combined point towards the 
likelihood that China‘s central government will have successfully implemented the IBT pricing 
scheme into all cities by the end of 2015.  
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The Impact of Water Management:  
  Since 1978, one of the drawbacks of China‘s merit based promotion system for 
government officials has been an overwhelming reliance on economic growth as the main 
criteria in evaluating cadres. Consequently, local officials overzealous in their attempts to meet 
the promotion criteria set forth by the central government have enacted policies to pursue high 
growth rates while disregarding the impact on the environment and natural resources.
174
 Only 
recently, has the government begun to focus on environmental conservation, and integrated it as 
part of the criteria considered in evaluating cadres.
175
 Prior to the announcement in April 2014 of 
the plan to implement the IBT water pricing scheme in all Chinese cites, China‘s NDRC also 
introduced a plan in February 2014 to factor ―water management‖ as one of the criteria used by 
the government to judge the performance of local officials. 
176
 Many hope that this new system 
will require Chinese officials to become more accountable for the environmental impacts of 
China‘s record-breaking economic growth.177  
 The impact of adding ―water management‖ as part of the criteria by which local cadre are 
evaluated and thereafter implementing the IBT pricing scheme is two-fold. First, the addition of 
―water management‖ and other criteria that place value on environmental conservation, 
demonstrates the changing priorities of China‘s central government, and the extent to which 
China‘s top leaders are beginning to realize the need for China to adopt policies that strike a 
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balance between economic growth and the preservation of natural resources and the environment.  
Second, the criteria of ―water management‖ will likely mean that policies, such as the IBT 
pricing scheme, will not only be enacted but also enforced to their fullest extent by local officials, 
as these officials now have a direct incentive for the pricing scheme and other water saving 
policies to be successful.  
3.4 China’s IBT Pricing Scheme Cost Effectiveness 
Comparison to the Los Angeles Model:  
 In the case of China‘s IBT pricing scheme, it is difficult to determine the future cost 
effectiveness of a plan that has not yet been fully implemented.  Therefore, in order to make 
assertions as to the plan‘s cost effectiveness, China‘s IBT plan will be compared to a successful 
IBT plan previously implemented in Los Angeles in the 1990s. This comparison will determine 
the extent to which China‘s IBT plan matches the criteria laid out by the Los Angeles IBT plan. 
Los Angeles‘ IBT scheme‘s success was contingent on top tier prices being set at ―the cost of 
replacement‖ or a level that was an accurate reflection of local water scarcity.178  China‘s IBT 
scheme failing to reflect China‘s current national level of water scarcity would likely undermine 
the effectiveness of the plan in solving current urban residential water shortages. 
 Los Angeles introduced increases in residential water prices in the 1990s based on a 
three-tiered pricing scheme that is similar to the one which China has planned to implement.
179
 
The LA plan was designed so that the price point paid by those in the bottom tier of the pricing 
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scheme reflected the average cost of water.
180
  If China‘s IBT is to imitate the LA model, those 
in the bottom tier, 80% of urban residents, should be paying the current average price for water 
in China.  
 Currently, average water price in China is approximately 0.8% of urban households‘ 
annual income.
181
 However, a report from China‘s NDRC indicates that a water tariff that 
constituted 2.5-3.0% of a household‘s annual income would be a price that would accurately 
reflect China‘s limited water recourses.182 Although the gap implies that the current baseline 
price of water is not an accurate reflection of the water scarcity currently faced by China, this 
does not necessarily imply that the government needs to adjust the base price to account for 
water scarcity. Based on the Los Angeles model, the increased prices in higher pricing tiers 
should be able to supplement for such water shortages.   
 According to the Los Angeles model, the price paid by the top block should reflect the 
true price of water.
183
 The true price of water is ―the real price of scarcity.‖184 This price should 
reflect the current state of water scarcity in China.  As part of China‘s IBT plan, residents in the 
top tier‘s water price will increase to three times the amount paid by those in the bottom tier. 
Therefore, if residents in the bottom block are paying 0.8% of their income, those in the top 
block will pay approximately 2.4% of their household‘s annual income. This would appear to put 
China just short of being in line with the Los Angeles plan, as according to China‘s NDRC 2.5% 
is the minimum price level needed to account for water scarcity in China.
185
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 However, the long-term success of China‘s IBT plan is contingent on the current base 
rate paid by residents in the bottom tier accurately reflecting the price of the average cost of 
supply of water in China, as the prices paid by the other two tiers are determined based off the 
bottom tier‘s price. There has been no indication from China‘s central government that has plans 
to unilaterally increase the base price of water for residents in all urban areas.
186
 Yet, if the base 
level price is inadequate then the tiered pricing system will fail to have a sustainable impact on 
water conservation in China‘s urban areas.  
Hong Kong Base Level Water Price Comparison:  
 By comparing average price of water in mainland China (the baseline price of the IBT 
scheme) to the average price of water in Hong Kong, it is possible to judge roughly the accuracy 
of the current baseline prices of China‘s IBT scheme. Overall, Hong Kong is the best city to 
make such a comparison to mainland China. Due to its proximity, Hong Kong suffers from a 
level of water stress similar to many of the cities in China that will be subject to price reform. 
Additionally, because of the one country two-system policy (一国两制)187 in place in China, 
Hong Kong‘s water prices more accurately reflect market prices, as they are not subject to as 
strict of government controls and subsidies.
188
  Therefore, the Hong Kong prices may be a more 
correct representation of accurate baseline prices.  
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 The baseline price for water in Hong Kong is 4.16 HKD or 0.55 USD.
189
 While in 
Guangzhou, one of the cities in China to have already implemented the new IBT pricing scheme, 
the baseline price is 1.98 RMB or 0.33 USD.
190
  From this data, it is evident that residents in 
Hong Kong are paying a base average rate almost double that of mainland China. This would 
imply that even if China‘s tiered prices scheme were to be successfully implemented in all cities, 
the program would be insufficient to make up for China‘s water shortage as base prices are set 
too low.  
3.5 IBT Pricing Scheme Environmental Impact: 
Water Quality and Quantity:  
Table 5
191
                                        Beijing Resident Water Survey  
Answers to Question “What do you care most about water?” 
Income of Respondents 
(RMB) 
Less than 
1000 
1000 ~ 
2000 
2000 ~ 
3000 
3000 ~ 
5000 
Above 
50000 
Total 
Respondent Numbers 36 56 54 28 26 200 
Quality 
Number 30 50 50 27 23 180 
Percentage 83.3% 89.3% 92.6% 96.4% 88.5% 90% 
Quantity 
Number 2 2 4 1 2 11 
Percentage 5.6% 3.6% 7.4% 3.7% 7.7% 5.5% 
Price 
Number 18 24 17 10 7 76 
Percentage 50.0% 42.9% 31.5% 35.7% 26.9% 38.0% 
Pressure 
Number 2 1 1 0 0 4 
Percentage 5.6% 1.8% 1.9% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 
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 Table 3 indicates is that across all income groups in China the largest concern among 
urban residents is water quality. Table 5  makes clear that of the 200 households surveyed, the 
majority
192
 ranked water quality as more and/or equally ―important‖ than water pricing.193 This 
emphasis on water quality is significant because though the IBT pricing scheme poses little to no 
direct threat of worsening water pollution, altering the price of water in urban areas does not 
change the quality of water provided to residents.  Beijing, the city in which the survey was 
conducted, suffers from both water increasing shortages and declining water quality.
194
 The 
implementation of the IBT pricing scheme in Beijing, will therefore not be able to solve 
problems in water quality, the aspect of water with which local residents are most concerned.
195
 
This is an inevitable limitation of China‘s IBT plan and there is very little that the central or local 
governments can do to modify the pricing scheme to improve water quality.  
3.6 IBT Pricing Scheme Overall Conclusions: 
Tariff Threshold for Water Conservation:  
 The extent to which adopting at tiered pricing system will be effective in terms of its 
environmental impact is largely dependent on the extent to which it is able to promote individual 
urban residents to conserve water. The adoption of an IBT scheme may help make urban 
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residents aware of water shortages and by doing so may promote them to make lasting life-style 
changes in their use of water.
196
 However, in order to be effective China‘s IBT plan must find a 
balance between the percentage of annual household income spent on water tariffs needed to 
insight immediate changes in residential water usages and the threshold at which the percentage 
of income becomes so large that it poses a threat to social stability.  
 In order to have the greatest impact on water conservation China‘s cities would need to 
adopt an IBT plan that would adjust the water prices in such a way that the largest possible 
number of participants were paying a water tariff that constituted a large enough percentage of 
their annual income so as to encourage them to change their water usage habits. According to a 
report by the World Bank, 5% is the threshold for the percentage of a household‘s annual income 
spent on water, which will prompt immediate short-term changes in households‘ water 
consumption patterns.
197
  
 China has not designed the recently adopted IBT scheme in such a way that majority of 
urban residents‘ water tariffs will constitute 5% of their annual income.198 The IBT plan in its 
current form only alters the price of water for the top 20% of users.
199
 For the majority of urban 
residents, whose water tariff rates will remain unchanged, and the water tariff will only constitute 
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approximately 1% of their annual household income.
200
 This base rate water price is unlikely to 
be altered and falls well below the 5% of annual household income specified by the World Bank 
report. These urban residents in the bottom tier of the pricing scheme are unlikely to feel any 
incentive or pressure to alter their current water usage habits. Even those residents in the top tier, 
who do experience an increase in their water tariff, will only have water prices raised to 
constitute approximately 2.4% of their annual household income.
201
  This would imply that even 
after the IBT pricing scheme has been fully implemented China‘s urban water prices will remain 
too low to bring about an immediate changed in urban residential water consumption patterns.  
 However, though China‘s IBT scheme is unlikely to cause short-term changes in water 
consumption patterns, the adoption of this policy may have a long-term impact on China by 
altering people‘s mindset towards water conservation. Over the long term, implementing an IBT 
pricing scheme may increase China‘s urban residents‘ awareness of water shortages through 
expose to the goals of the policy presents to residents through the media and other mediums. 
  An investigation by the Beijing Municipal Water Conservation Management Center 
determined that of the respondents surveyed, over 53% felt that their awareness of water scarcity 
in China ―is closely related to [the implementing of] water price reform.‖202As people are made 
more socially aware of water shortages in China, this is likely to result in changes over the long-
term in urban residential water consumption patterns. Therefore, the impact of adopting an IBT 
plan may increase social understanding of water shortages in China, which could manifest itself 
                                                          
200
 Zhang, Shiqiu, Liangchun Deng, Peng Yue, and Huishan Cui. "Study on Water Tariff Reform and Income 
Impacts in China‘s Metropolitan Areas: The Case of Beijing." The World Bank. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/Resources/ReportWaterpricingBeijingENFi
nal.pdf. 
201
 Tan, Debra. "Pricing Water." China Water Risk, 2014. http://chinawaterrisk.org/opinions/pricing-water/.   
202
 Zhang, Shiqiu, Liangchun Deng, Peng Yue, and Huishan Cui. "Study on Water Tariff Reform and Income 
Impacts in China‘s Metropolitan Areas: The Case of Beijing." The World Bank. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/Resources/ReportWaterpricingBeijingENFi
nal.pdf. 
58 
 
in changes in urban resident‘s patterns of water consumption. This, in the long term, might lessen 
the severity of water shortage currently faced by urban communities in China.   
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CHAPTER 4: DESALINATION PLANTS 
 4.1 Desalination Plants in China Project Background: 
 Reverse osmosis (RO) desalination exploits the fact that solutions at different 
concentrations will always seek to average out their concentrations.
203
 Thus, if fresh water and 
salt water are kept apart by a porousmembrane, over time the concentration of salt in the salt 
water will decrease, while the concentration of salt in the fresh water will increase, until both 
approach a similar value.
204
  To reverse this process, essentially making freshwater from salt 
water, the water must be highly pressurized to separate the salt from the water.
205
  
Below are basic steps outlining how RO desalination works (Image 6):  
1. Salt water is brought in from the ocean and filtered to keep large living creatures and 
waste out of the water.
206
  
2. The salt water is then highly pressurized (to 3000-4000 psi or more than 200 times 
atmospheric pressure) using a pump.
207
 
3. This pressurized water is then passed through a porous membrane to separate the salt 
from the water.
208
 The pores are small enough that only water molecules can pass 
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through.
209
 This is the first stage of separation to get the maximum amount of freshwater 
output.
210
 The waste streamed from this process is brine, or high concentration salt 
water.
211
 (Image 7) 
4. The brine is then re-pressurized by another pump to pass through another set of 
membranes to extract more potable water.
212
 
5. The pressurized brine is passed through another set of membranes, rsulting in a smaller 
amount of freshwater, and a more concentrated stream of brine.
213
  
 Image 6
214
   Basic RO Desalination Plant Process
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Image 7
215
    RO Desalination Membrane  
 
 Reverse osmosis membranes are typically very expensive due to the precision required 
for the construction of such fine membranes.
216
 However, advances in materials, science and 
nanoengineering, specifically the ability to mass produce microscale structures has resulted in a 
relatively lower cost for producing the membranes required for RO desalination.
217
  
 China‘s two largest RO desalination plants are the Qingdao and Tianjin Dangang RO 
desalination facilities.
218
 Together the two plants supply China with approximately 200,000 m
3
 
of potable water a day.
219
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Image 8
220
     Tianjin Desalination Plant Process 
 
 Tianjin‘s RO plant receives feed water from the Bo Sea that has been pretreated using an 
ultrafiltration membrane system supplied by Hyflux, a Singapore based company.
221
 The plant is 
designed to produce up to 150,000 m
3
 a day of potable water
222
. One of the world‘s largest RO 
plants, the Tainjin plant‘s pretreatment system processes approximately 250,000 m3 of seawater 
a day.
223
 Seawater intake pumps deliver the seawater through the pretreatment system to eight 
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independent seawater RO trains, (image 8) each of which is designed to deliver up to 12,500 m
3
 
of treated water a day.
224
 Equipped with a single main high pressure pump, membrane rack, 
energy recovery system and circulation pump, each train runs between 12.5% and 100% 
capacity.
225
 
Image 9
226
    Qingdao Desalination Plant Process  
 
 The Qingdao desalination plant provides up to 100,000 cubic meters of drinking water 
daily to Qingdao‘s municipal grid.227 The plant began operation in June of 2012, the plant‘s six 
                                                          
224
 Hyflux. "Shaping the Water Space." http://www.hyflux.com/misc/Hyflux_Corporate_Brochure_2013.pdf. 
225
 Ibid., 16 
226
 Clemente, Rodney. "China‘s Mega-Desalination Plant Experience: A White Paper on the Long-term Energy 
Efficiency of China‘s Largest Desalination Plants." Energy Recovery Inc., 2013. 
http://www.energyrecovery.com/sites/default/files/ERI-WP_China MegaPlants_Oct2013.pdf. 
227
 Furest, Bárbara, and Patricia Meléndez. "Abengoa Starts Commercial Operations at the Qingdao Desalination 
Plant in China." Www.abengoa.com. 
64 
 
trains supply between 15 and 20 percent of the water used by Qingdao‘s nearly three million 
residents.
228
 The majority owner of the plant is the Spanish company Abengoa. 
229
 The Qingdao 
plant operates similarly to the Tianjin RO plant. Water from the Jiaozhou Gulf is pretreated by 
an ultra-filtration (UF) membrane system that processes up to 250,000 m
3
 of feed water a day.
230
 
Then intake pumps deliver feed water through the UF pretreatment system to three main high-
pressure pumps and the plant‘s energy recovery system.231 However, unlike the Tianjin plant the 
Qingdao plant uses a semi-pressure design, where each high-pressure pump supplies two 
membrane trains, though each train still has an individual energy recovery system and circulation 
pump.
232
 (image 9)  
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4.2 Desalination Distributional Equality: 
The Distribution of Desalination Plants:  
Image 10
233
    Map of Desalination Plants in China 
 
 The distribution of desalination plants in China has thus far been limited to the east coast 
making this geographically a rather limited solution to combating water shortages in China. As 
looking at the map makes clear only those cities and towns located along China‘s eastern coast 
would have access to an abundant enough source of salt water to be able to sustain viable 
desalination plants. Though desalination is likely not a solution for the majority of landlocked 
Western China, it is also important to consider that China's current population is by no means 
equally distributed across the country.  
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 According to China‘s 2010 census, 57.3% of China's population lived in urban areas with 
the most populated cities being Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou, all of which are located on 
China‘s eastern coast.234  China‘s National Bureau of Statistics has projected that China‘s urban 
population will grow to constitute 60% of China‘s total population by 2020.235 The possible 
construction of desalination facilities in such eastern coastal cities would potentially have a large 
impact on local water shortages, likely only to be exacerbated by growing populations. This 
combination of raising populations and increasing levels of water scarcity make  coastal urban 
areas the core of China's water shortage crisis. Therefore, despite the limited geographic reach of 
desalination, it is still an effective tool in fighting water shortages in China.  The construction of 
desalination plants could provide a continuous source of potable water directly to coastal cities in 
China suffering from water shortages.  
The Possibility of Piping Water:  
 One option to potentially increase the distributional equality of desalination in China 
would be to build up a water transportation infrastructure of pipes, which could be used to 
transfer water from desalination facilities to other water stressed areas. Currently the best 
example of this is the desolation plant in Tianjin that in addition to providing water to its own 
municipality also pipes water into Beijing.
236
 Beijing is considered a severely water stressed city, 
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due primarily to geographic factors such as historically low rainfall, rising population pressures, 
and rapidly increasing levels of industrialization.
237
  
 The piping of desalinated water from Tianjin has been effective as another means used to 
increase Beijing‘s dwindling water supply.238 Since 2013, two 275 km long pipelines, each 
approximately 1.5 m in diameter, pass through two pumping stations in order to pass potable 
water directly to eastern Beijing.
239
 However, the current success of this project does not 
necessarily ensure that other piping projects will be equally effective. The Tianjin-Beijing 
pipeline is not necessarily an accurate reflection of the potential impacts of piping desalinated 
water to other sites. The relative proximity of the two cites as well as the heavy industrialization 
of both cities, provide close to ideal conditions for the piping of desalinated water to occur. 
Piping along longer routes could have a negative environmental impact due to the construction of 
the required infrastructure that would disrupt local ecosystems, and increase levels of water 
pollution. As a result of these potential environmental impacts, desalination is likely to remain a 
relatively limited in its distribution.  
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4.3 The Political Feasibility of Desalination: 
Current Government Involvement:  
 The 11
th
 five-year plan represents the first time desalination is presented as part of the 
solution to China‘s water management, and set targets for national desalination output.240 This 
indicates that China's central government recognizes desalination as a legitimate and feasible 
solution to chronic water shortages. Desalination also appeared as the part of China‘s water 
management initiative in the 12
th
 five-year plan, and in 2016 will likely continue to be 
incorporated as part of the solution for solving water scarcity in China‘s 13th five-year plan.241  
 This recognition and support from the central government will likely play an important 
role in the development of China‘s future desalination plants in. China is an authoritarian state 
and history would suggest that of those projects that are able to have the largest impact on 
Chinese society have been those implemented from the top down with the support of China‘s 
central government.  Therefore, should the Chinese government prioritize the construction of 
desalination facilities as a solution to water scarcity, it is likely that the number of desalination 
plants in operation in the future would steadily increase.   
 Despite this potential for expansion, there are two shortcomings that could possibly 
prevent the central government from increasing their investment in desalination. The first is that 
the CCP has already invested large amounts of time and money into the SNRT project, and hails 
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the project as the savior solution to water shortages in Northern China.
242
 Because of the 
emphasies placed by China's central government on the SNRT project, it is likely that there will 
be fewer resources and less motivation to finance the construction of desalination plants. The 
ever- increasing price tag of SNRT project has required the central government to continue to 
pour resources into the project, resources which otherwise could be used to finance the 
construction and operation of desalination plants.
243
 
 Secondly,  as will be examined later China currently lacks a domestic desalination 
technology market.
244
 This means that the majority of the expertise and technology for the 
construction of desalination plants will continued to be imported. Cities such as Qingdao, have 
dealt with the lack of domestic technology by allowing an outside foreign companies to such as 
Spain‘s Abengoa, to use their own expertise and technology to construct a desalination plant in 
China.
245
 However, adopting the strategy of encouraging foreign companies to construct 
desalination plants in China, places perhaps too much of the direct control over the development 
of desalination outside of the hands of China's central government. Therefore, though China‘s 
central government may be reluctant to finance desalination plants, as a result of the SNRT 
project, they will also likely be even more reluctant to adopt measures that encourage foreign 
control over domestic desalination operations.  
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Privatization and Government Regulation:  
 Even if the central government not wish to invest directly in desalination, in order for the 
market to be successful, the central government will still likely need to adopt legislation that 
makes the desalination market more appealing and profitable to private companies. The 
desalination market in China is still relatively new and developing and as a result is largely 
unstructured.
246
 Only China's central government will be able to provide the structure needed to 
make the desalination market in China appealing to private companies.
247
Private companies will 
need to see that desalination is profitable before they are willing to invest in a venture with such 
a high startup and operations cost. 
248
 
 Currently, upward of 70% of desalination facilities in China are ―financed by the industry 
end users or the government.‖249 Nearly 90% of desalinated water in China is currently being 
used by key industries such as metal production, nuclear power, and large industrial parks that 
are highly centralized and monitored by the government.
250
 Though the percentage of desalinated 
water used for residential purposes is still relatively small, it is one of the fastest growing sector 
of the desalination industry. This growth is fueled by an ever-increasing need to overcome 
residential water shortages in China. 
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  As the government currently appears to remain apathetic towards financing the 
construction of desalination facilities for residential use, the argument can be made that another 
way to finance such projects would be through private firms. These firms potentially could be 
either Chinese or foreign, though due to the high cost and relatively novelty of desalination 
technology in China, it is more likely that financing would come from foreign firms. One 
example of this is the desalination plant in Qingdao, financed by Spanish company Abengoa.
251
  
 There are many advantages in privatizing the desalination industry in China. First, coastal 
towns and cities in China would be able to enjoy immediate relief from the current and future 
water shortages many of them currently face. Additionally, China‘s desalination plants would be 
able to take advantage of newer, more advanced, and ecologically friendly foreign desalination 
technology, without waiting for a domestic desalination technology industry mature.  In terms of 
economics, China would also be able to take advantages of these benefits without the need for 
the government to allocate funds to finance desalination facilities. By increasing the privatization 
of their desalination industry China is able to receive all of the benefits of increased use of 
desalination to solve residential water shortages, without the central or local governments 
needing to bear the brunt of the financial burden.  
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4.4 Desalination Cost Effectiveness: 
Expensive Technology:   
 One aspect impeding the expansion of desalination in China is the high cost associated 
with the technology. The high prices of the desalination technology significantly push up the 
startup costs for firms looking to enter the market.
252
 The most prominent type of desalination 
technology used in China is the RO process.
253
 Although RO technology is no longer novel at the 
international level, as it has been used by commercial desalination plants for over 50 years, it is 
still a relatively new phenomenon in China.
254
 
 The most important consequences of the relative newness of this industry in China, is that 
Chinese firms have not yet caught up to the global learning curve in terms of RO desalination. In 
China, there is currently little domestic development or production of RO desalination 
technology.
255
 Additionally, foreign companies have the patents on much of the world‘s 
desalination technology, particularly the newest and most eco-friendly methods of desalination.  
This means that Chinese companies must import almost all of the RO technology and equipment 
used in desalination, as they cannot purchase it from domestic manufactures. This in turn drives 
up the price of constructing desalination facilities in China.  
 Were desalination to become a more popular and widespread form of combating water 
scarcity in China, Chinese companies both privately owned and those sponsored by the 
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government would likely have more incentive to direct funds towards developing China‘s own 
desalination technology market. This increase in investment in RO technology development 
would in turn likely reduce startup costs, thus making desalination a more affordable alternative 
to combat water scarcity primarily in China‘s coastal regions. However, this is the contradiction 
currently faced by China‘s desalination industry. Until the construction of desalination facilities 
is a strategy prominently adopted by China‘s coastal regions to lessen the severity of water 
shortages in China, there is little incentive to invest in the domestic development of the 
technologies needed for China to be able to run large scale desalination facilities that are both 
economically, and environmentally efficient.  Although Chinese companies are beginning to 
invest in the development of desalination domestic technologies, for this to become a profitable 
industry it must expand with the speed necessary to be able to support China‘s potential growing 
desalination plants.
256
 
 Again, it is likely that the solution to overcoming the current high cost of desalination in 
China lies in the Chinese government continued support for the construction of desalination 
facilities as a potential solution to water shortages. However, there are currently no government 
incentives or funds designated for desalination projects.  Financing remains the largest obstacle 
preventing Chinese companies with the technology from being able to ―tap into the Chinese 
market.‖257  Should the Chinese government begin to make desalination a higher priority it is 
likely that this would drive domestic development of RO technology and foster the growth of a 
desalination industry in China through lower prices and better technology.  
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Low Water Prices:  
 Perhaps the largest barrier to fostering a successful desalination industry for residential 
use in China is low water prices.  Due to the  limited timeframe of operations RO plants are not 
cost effective in areas where freshwater sells for under 0.50 USD per cubic meter, since the 
membrane replacement and plant construction costs are never recovered by the desalination plant 
operator.
258 In China, the CCP subsidizes residential water prices, ensuring that the value of 
water is far below market price.
259
  By keeping water tariffs low, the CCP is able to help 
guarantee that all citizens are able to afford water, one of the necessities of life. However from a 
business standpoint, foreign companies are unlikely to undertake the arduous process of 
constructing and maintaining a desalination plant in China, when start-up costs for such projects 
are already incredibly high, and there is a limited timeframe of feasible operation.
260
  China‘s 
low water prices severely restrict the profit such a frame would be able to generate through the 
project. This means that there is little incentive for foreign firms, or even private Chinese firms 
to invest in such a project without the support and financing of Chinese government, a support 
which to date has been limited.  
Limited Lifespan: 
 Another factor, which must be considered when examining the cost effectiveness of 
desalination facilities in China, is the longevity of the operations. For example, the Qingdao 
desalination plant that began operation in 2010 is only designed to operate for twenty-five years, 
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or until 2035.
261
  Twenty-five years is the typical operational lifespan of the RO desalination 
plant.
262
  This relatively short lifespan is due to the process of RO, which as explained earlier, 
works by forcing pressurized saltwater through a membrane filter.
263
Overtime, these membrane 
filters become clogged, and thus unable to remove salt from water.
264
 
 There have been some recent developments towards redesigning RO membrane filters so 
that they do not become clogged overtime, and there are other methods of desalination such as 
forward osmosis (FO) 
265
which have the potential to offer desalination facilities a longer lifespan. 
However, these technologies are still experimental, and are not currently in use in China.  
Therefore, desalination facilities in China continue to operate under a twenty-five year lifespan. 
This limited timeframe of viable operation is likely to prevent China from being able to attract 
increased private financing for desalination facilities. Although firms in the desalination industry 
understand that twenty-five years is the limited timeframe under which they can be profitable, 
this coupled with China‘s low water prices, and the high cost of startups, do not create an 
optimal environment for a the development of a profitable industry.   
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4.5 Desalination Environmental Impact 
Brine Disposal:   
 One of the largest environmental hurdles countries encounter when building desalination 
plants, is brine disposal.
266
 Brine is the super concentrated salt by-product that left after the 
potable water has been separated during the desalination process.
267
 The output of brine by 
desalination facility can be equivalent of up to 55% of the plant‘s intake flow.268 Therefore, once 
seawater has been desalinized and the potable water is removed, the issue remains of how to 
dispose of the sizable amount of brine waste left behind by the process.  
 The simplest method for brine disposal is of course to pipe it back out into the ocean, 
through a brine outflow pipe.
269
 Though this is the easiest method for brine disposal it is also the 
least environmentally friendly.
270
 Since brine has a much higher concentration of salt than the 
surrounding seawater and is much denser, when pumped back into the ocean brine tends to settle 
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near the seafloor.
271
 This creates a plum of ultra-salty water on the ocean floor, which can 
adversely affect some aquatic ecosystems.
272
  
 Another, more environmentally friendly means to dispose of brine is to recycle the brine 
by converting it into saltcrete.
273
 Saltcrete is a compound formed through a mixture of brine, salt, 
and cement.
274
 Many communites that rely on desalination, then often use saltcrete as part of the 
mixture for asphalt when paving roads.
275
 The converting of brine into saltcrete is the most 
common form of brine disposal used by desalination plants across the globe.
276
  
 The final method of brine disposal is to convert the brine into salt, which the case of the 
Tianjin plant is then collected and sold to generate revenue.
277
 In order to form salt, once 
desalination is complete the brine is put through an additional RO process that ―produces very 
salt concentrated water.‖278 This concentrated solution is then left to dry out.279 Once all the 
water has evaporated, what is left is the salt that the company is then able to repackage and 
sell.
280
 Although the process of recycling brine to form salt is more time and perhaps energy 
intensive, it is more environmentally friendly than pumping the brine back into the ocean, and 
offers desalination plants an additional revenue source.  
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RO and Energy Consumption: 
Table 6
281
    Qingdao’s Water Supply Energy Requirement 
 
 The largest environmental concern for China in terms of expanding desalination is the 
amount of energy required to operate a RO desalination plant. In order for RO to be effective, the 
water must be highly pressurized before it can be pumped through the membrane that draws out 
potable water.
282
 This pressurizing of the water is the most energy intensive aspect of the RO 
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desalination process.
283
 Table 6 indicates that in Qingdao the desalination of seawater consumes 
roughly 10 times more energy than the extraction and processing of local surface water.
284
   
 Currently in China, coal is the ―dominant energy source, accounting for approximately 79% 
of the total electricity produced in 2012.‖285 Much of China‘s current desalination industry is 
equally as coal dependent.  Therefore, the production of more desalinated water would likely 
―simultaneously increase greenhouse gas emissions.‖286This is particularly alarming as China is 
already one of the world‘s largest producers of greenhouse gases.287  One study, conducted prior 
to the construction of Qingdao‘s desalination plant, indicated that the plant would increase the 
city‘s greenhouse gas emissions by as much as 80%.288 Although this number may be a slight 
overestimate, especially as the Qingdao plant has yet to operate at full capacity, the construction 
of the desalination plant has still likely increased Qingdao‘s overall greenhouse gas emissions.289 
The increased energy and environmental costs of desalination are important, as a long-term 
solution to China‘s current water shortages should be one in which China does not have to 
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choose between maintaining sufficient amounts of potable water, or low levels of environmental 
pollution.  
 One way for China to overcome the potentially adverse environmental effects of 
desalination is the method used in the Tianjin desalination plant. In the Tianjin model, the 
desalination facility operates in tandem with a local power plant.
290
 This model recycles the 
excess steam produced by the power plant, and harnesses the energy produced by the steam to 
pressurize the water in the desalination plant.
291
 This method of using the steam produced by the 
power plant has decreased the amount of energy consumed by the Tianjin desalination plant.
292
 
Thus, the Tianjin desalination plant may represent a model that China could expand upon in an 
attempt to strike a balance between water shortages and environmental pollution.  
Threat to Marine Biodiversity:   
  Over the long term, another environmental threat inevitably posed by desalination plants 
is the threat to the local marine biodiversity.
293
 In order to be productive desalination plants rely 
on a steady stream of salt water.
294
  As a result, the majority of desalination facilities are located 
on the coast, often built with large pipes that extend directly into the ocean.
295
 The problem is 
that these pipes often inadvertently draw in thousands of plankton, certain types of fish eggs, and 
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other microorganisms disrupting local marine biodiversity.
296
 The inability of these pipes to 
separate such organisms from the seawater required by desalination plants, poses a threat in the 
long-term to the biodiversity of the local saltwater ecosystems on which the desalination 
facilities rely.
297
 This potential threat to biodiversity is a weakness of the process of desalination 
that is difficult to overcome.
298
 This is a risk that must be taken into consideration, should the 
construction of desalination facilities become prevalent in China‘scoastal cities.  
4.6 Desalination Overall Conclusions:  
Tianjin:  
 Tianjin and nearby Beijing suffer from some of the highest rates of water scarcity in 
China, made worse by the two cities‘ large and ever-growing populations.299 Due to the 
population pressures for an increasing water supply, in 2010 China began construction on the 
country‘s largest desalination facility in Tianjin.300 The facility opened in 2013, and by 2014 the 
plant‘s output had reached approximately 200,000 m3 of water a day.301   At this rate, the plant 
would only be able to annually produce 73 million m
3
 of water.
302
 Though not unimpactful, the 
output of potable water from desalination alone is insufficient to solve Beijing or Tianjin‘s 
current water crisis. Beijing alone in 2009 consumed over 1 billion m
3 
of water for residential 
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use.
303
 This number does not include the city‘s even higher annual industrial consumption of 
water.
304
 This indicates that desalination, though it will undoubtedly help to alleviate some 
strains of water shortages, on its own is not enough to solve the water scarcities of either of these 
two cities. 
Qingdao:  
 As discussed earlier the Qingdao plant it is only able to produce 100,000 m
3
 of potable 
water a day, enough according to Abengoa, to fulfill the daily water needs of roughly half a 
million people.
305
 Qingdao has an urban population of over 3 million, and a total population of 
over 7 million.
306
 This means that desalination alone is only able to meet the consumption needs 
of approximately 16% of the city‘s urban population, and only approximately 7% of total 
residential consumption needs.
307
 This additional output of potable water has undoubtedly aided 
Qingdao, relieving some of the water scarcity faced by many northern cities in China. However, 
it is clear from the data, as well as the twenty-five year limited timeframe of operation for the 
Qingdao desalination plant, that desalination in Qingdao, as in Tianjin is neither a permanent nor 
a complete solution to combating residential water shortages.  
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Limited Timeframe:  
 As discussed earlier in the chapter, RO desalination facilities currently being constructed 
in China have an operational lifespan of only twenty-five years, due to the clogging over time of 
the filtration membranes.
308
 This limited timeframe of operation dictates, that desalination is not 
a long-term solution to China‘s water problems. Even if coastal cities in China were to begin to 
rely on desalination to ease current water shortages, this would be the equivalent of simply 
putting a very expensive Band-Aid on the problem of urban residential water scarcities.  
 This is because in twenty-five years when current desalination facilities become 
inoperable, those areas that are dependent on them for water will be forced to find another 
solution. It is possible that in the future desalination technology will have developed innovations 
that increase the operational longevity of desalination plants. Nevertheless, as no such 
technology currently exists outside of the experimental phase, this paper must operate under the 
assumption that the utility of current desalination plants will be limited to a twenty-five year 
operational lifetime.  
Failure to Meet Official Output Goals:  
 As mentioned earlier, China‘s 11th 5-year plan (2006-2011) was the first to mention 
desalination.
309
 Additionally, the plan set target output levels of desalination in China that China 
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fell short of meeting.
310
 Although failing to meet the stated goals a five-year plan is rather 
unusual in China, the 12
th
 five-year plan also sets aggressive targets for China‘s coming 
desalination output at 2.2 - 2.6 million m
3
 daily capacity by 2015.
311
 The continued incorporation 
of desalination into China‘s five-year plans is an encouraging sign for the industries development. 
However, the conclusion drawn from this chapter is that without additional measures taken to 
allocate funding, increase financing, and adopt legislation desalination projects will not be able 
to find the momentum they need to become a viable solution to supplying China‘s urban 
residential areas with potable water.  
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CONCLUSION: 
 
 China, particularly China‘s urban residential areas are currently facing water shortages 
that if left unsolved will likely not only undermine China‘s economic progress, but could also 
threaten the nation‘s political and social stability.  In order to combat such water shortages, 
China‘s central government has enacted a variety of policies, which seek to solve China‘s water 
crisis through a variety of different methods. Overall, the conclusion that can be drawn from this 
paper is that of the three projects examined above, each has its own unique strengths and yet 
none is capable of on its own completely solving China‘s current urban residential potable water 
shortages.  
 The three projects examined in this research represent the diversity, of both projects that 
seek to curb the demand of potable water, as well as projects focused on increasing the supply of 
potable water in China. However, there is one aspect of solving China‘s water shortages that 
these three project that fail to address; a solution that primarily seeks to increase water 
conservation among China‘s urban residents. Increasing water conservation on an individual 
level does not necessarily decrease individual residents‘ demand, however it does aid in 
increasing the supply of potable water without the need for massive engineering projects as 
residents area able to reuse the water already available to them. The inability of any of the three 
projects discussed to seek to incentivize individual water conservation is perhaps each project‘s 
greatest weakness, as water conservation is the most sustainable means to combat water 
shortages in China.  
86 
 
 When examining the current projects constructed to combat China‘s urban water, scarcity 
it is important to consider the differences in water scarcity inherent in China‘s geography.  
Projects, such as the IBT pricing scheme, that are meant to be unilaterally adopted across China 
are weak in that they fail to allow enough individualism to necessarily be the most appropriate 
method of dealing with localized issues of  water scarcity. Additionally, projects such as the 
SNRT project, which seeks to take advantage of the natural disparity in China‘s potable water 
distribution, is not sustainable as this project threatens to create water shortages in Southern 
China in order to solve water shortages in Northern China.   
 Additionally, one of the other weaknesses is that projects such as the SNRT project and 
the construction of desalination facilities struggle to maintain both a high level of cost 
effectiveness and a simultaneously low environmental impact. Any plan that would require 
China supply urban residents with potable water at the cost of further environmental denigration 
would ultimately prove to be unsustainable.   
 Overall, perhaps the most viable solution to combating water shortages in China‘s urban 
residential areas may not come through the implementation of a single policy, or project. Rather 
the unique strengthens and weaknesses inherent in each of the three projects examined above 
would suggest that the most sustainable and impactful solution would be to simultaneously 
adopting multiple plans and projects. Ultimately to be effective such plans would need to strike a 
balance between economic efficiency and environmental conservation, be individualized enough 
to suit the localized needs of specific communities, and focus on curbing water demand, 
encouraging water conservation while simultaneously seeking to increase the amount of potable 
water to China‘s residential areas.  
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